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ABSTRACT 
This paper focuses on the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. 
First, a short overview of the doctrine's principles will be given. Secondly, the 
doctrine will be analysed from a theoretical and historical point of view, and some 
features of the constitutions of New Zealand, the United Kingdom and Germany 
will be examined, which raise doubts about the application of the doctrine. 
I will draw the conclusion that the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty is 
paradoxical and illogical , historically doubtful and due to the possibility of different 
definitions useless and therefore an obstacle to a substantial discussion about 
today's constitution. 
Therefore, I will suggest that the concept of popular sovereignty should 
substitute for the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. 
WORD LENGTH 
The text of this paper (excluding contents page, footnotes , bibliography) 
comprises approximately 13,477 words. 
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I INTRODUCTION 
The ideal of limited government postulates a separation of the three branches 
of government: executive, legislature and judiciary.
1 
Although most states subscribe to the separation of powers, there are 
differences in the relationship between the different branches, especially in the 
relationship between the legislature and the judiciary. 
Any legal and political system has to make choices as to the nature of the 
constraints, which are imposed on the majority as expressed through the 
legislature.2 A classic legal form is for the courts to have some power of 
constitutional review over acts of the legislature and have the power to invalidate 
primary legislation on the grounds that it violates, either procedurally or 
substantively, principles contained in a written constitution or Bill of Rights - this 
concept is used in Germany. A court may have the power to engage in pre-
enactment constitutional review, even though there is no such power once the 
relevant legislation has actually been enacted - that concept is used in France. In the 
United Kingdom and New Zealand, courts are not allowed to strike down or 
challenge Parliament's legislation according to the doctrine of parliamentary 
sovereignty. 
Framed in another way, under this doctrine Parliament, being the theoretical 
emanation of democracy, can override the core elements of the constitution, and 
fundamental human rights. Such a prospect might seem alarming.
3 
One response is purely pragmatic: these things will never occur. But this is a 
political rather than a legal safeguard.4
 Nor can one be confident that the 
1 Philip Joseph "The Legal History and Framework of the Constitution" in Colin James (ed) Building 
the Constitution (Institute of Policy Studies, Wellington, 2000) 168. 
2 Paul Craig "Constitutionalism, Regulation and Review" in Robert Hazell (ed) Constitutional 
Futures -A History of the Next Ten Years (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999) 67 . 
3 E W Thomas "The Relationship of Parliament and the Courts: A Tentative Thought or Two for the 
New Millennium" (2000) 31 VUWLR 5, 15. 
4 Thomas, above, 15. 
5 
improbable will never occur.5 The lessons Germany's history should be taken into 
account, where the seemingly unthinkable occurred. In all, one cannot be wholly 
confident that today's improbability may not be tomorrow's crisis.
6 
Thus, the question whether the judiciary must acknowledge Parliament's 
sovereign legislative power without qualification, has been raised ever since the 
Glorious Revolution of 1688. A great number of judges have positively affirmed the 
doctrine of parliamentary supremacy. On the other hand, many academics,
7 and an 
increasing number of Judges writing extra-judicially8, have concluded that 
Parliament's power is less than omnipotent and that, in extreme circumstances, the 
validity of legislation can be reviewed by the courts. 
Some think that this debate should be left unresolved:
9 
An answer should be deferred until such time as the 
courts are in fact confronted with legislation which raises 
a fundamental constitutional issue and places in jeopardy 
the basis of representative government, the rule of law, or 
the fundamental rights and freedoms which are embedded 
in these democratic ideals. Much will necessarily depend 
on the circumstances at that time. Until then, the answer 
need not be known; it can, as it were, be left up in the 
constitutional air. 
On the other hand, Professor Jaffe stated, in my view more convincingly, that 
"a judiciary which too much reminds itself that its power is limited by the dogmas 
of Parliamentary omni-competence, Parliamentary supremacy and Parliamentary 
responsibility may lose the will to exercise" this "great historic function"
10
. 
5 E W Thomas "The Relationship of Parliament and the Courts: A Tentative Thought or Two for the 
New Millennium" (2000) 31 VUWLR 5, 15. 
6 Thomas, above, 16. 
7 For example: Philip Allott "The Courts and Parliament : Who Whom?" [1979] CLJ 79, 116; T R S 
Allan "The Limits of Parliamentary Sovereignty" [1985] PL 614. 
8 Rt Hon Sir Robin Cooke "Fundamentals" [1988] NZLJ 158, 164; Rt Hon Lord Woolf of Barnes 
"Droit Public - English Style" [ 1995] PL 57, 69; Hon Sir John Laws "Law and Democracy" [ 1995] 
PL 72, 92; Sir Stephen Sedley "Human Rights: A Twenty-First Century Agenda" [1995] PL 386; T 
R S Allan "Parliamentary Sovereignty: Law, Politics, and Revolution" [1997] 113 LQR 443,449. 
9 Thomas, above, 7. 
'
0 Louis L Jaffe English and American Judges as Lawmakers (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1969) 19. 
Although having the opposite opinion, E W Thomas delivers the reason: 
11 
It is all to easy for judges who are faced with a "hard" 
case for which there is no direct rule or precedence to 
attribute the responsibility for the harshness of the 
outcome to Parliament; rational legal analysis is 
abandoned in favour of leaving the problem to the 
legislature; the injustice which results, or the fact that the 
law fails to meet the current needs and reasonable 
expectations of the community, can be blamed on that 
institution; this reasoning process may occur even where 
there is little or no prospect that Parliament will legislate 
to remedy the problem. 
6 
Therefore, this paper focuses on the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. 
The doctrine will be outlined in part II and analysed in part ID regarding theory (part 
ID A), history (part ID B) and its contemporary applications in New Zealand, the 
United Kingdom and Germany (part ID C). Then, it will be assessed in part IV, 
before the alternative concept of popular sovereignty will be introduced in part V. 
11 E W Thomas "The Relationship of Parliament and the Courts: A Tentative Thought or Two for the 
New Millennium" (2000) 31 VUWLR 31. 
7 
II WHAT IS PARLIAMENTARY SOVEREIGNTY? 
Some deem the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty a bulwark of the 
constitution, for others it is an obstacle regarding desirable reforms of the 
constitution. 12 But what exactly is the doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty ? 
Albert Venn Dicey described the doctrine in the following way: 13 
The principle of Parliamentary sovereignty means neither 
more nor less than this, namely, that Parliament ... 
[defined as The Queen in Parliament] has, under the 
English constitution, the right to make or unmake any law 
whatever; and, further, that no person or body is 
recognised by the law of England as having a right to 
override or set aside the legislation of Parliament. 
Others describe parliamentary sovereignty as the unequalled, and indisputable 
law-making power, 14 or as the absolute powers of law-making.15 
The doctrine can best be illustrated by the following important and correlated 
principles: no higher law-making power, Parliamentary legislature cannot be 
challenged, Parliament cannot bind its successors and implied repeal. 
The principle that Parliament is the highest law-making body is comprised of 
two meanings. First, Parliament may pass any law. For example, if the United 
Kingdom Parliament enacted that smoking in the streets of Paris is an offence, then 
it is an offence - naturally, it is an offence by English law and not by French law, 
and therefore it would be regarded as an offence only by those who paid attention to 
English law.16 It means secondly, that acts of Parliament override all other law, 
12 A W Bradley "The Sovereignty of Parliament - in Perpetuity ?" in Jeffrey Jowell and Dawn 
Oliver (eds) The Changing Constitution (3ed, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1994) 79 . 
13 
Albert Venn Dicey Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution ( lOed, 1885; reprinted : 
Macmillan & Co, London, 1959) 71. 
14 Morag McDowell and Duncan Webb The New Zealand Legal System (2ed, Butterworths, 
Wellington, 1998) 123. 
15 Philip A Joseph Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand (2ed, Brookers, 
Wellington, 2001 ) 441. 
16 Ivor Jennings The Law and the Constitution (5ed, University of London Press, 1959) 172 . 
8 
including common law, judicial precedents, and other judge-made law. It prevails 
over prerogative instruments issued under the Crown's power, as well as, over 
delegated legislation passed by subordinate bodies upon whom a law-making power 
is granted, and international law, which does not become binding unless 
incorporated in the domestic law. 17 
The principle, that Parliamentary legislature cannot be challenged, means that 
the judiciary cannot overturn Parliament's legislation, provided it follows manner 
and form as prescribed by statute. 18 Lord Morris summarised the reasons: 
19 
It is the function of the courts to administer the laws 
which Parliament has enacted. In the processes of 
Parliament there will be much consideration whether a 
bill should or should not in one form or another become 
an enactment. When an enactment is passed there is 
finality unless and until it is amended or repealed by 
Parliament. In the courts there may be argument as to the 
correct interpretation of the enactment: there must be 
none as to whether it should be on the statute book at all. 
Furthermore, it was reasoned in Cheney v Conn, that "What the statute itself 
enacts cannot be unlawful, because what the statute says and provides is itself the 
law, and the highest form of law that is known in the country."
20 
Another principle of the doctrine is that Parliament cannot bind its successor, 
as the next Parliament enjoys the same law-making power. Or expressed 
conversely, every Parliament is not bound by its predecessor and can repeal every 
former act. 
17 Morag McDowell and Duncan Webb The New Zealand l egal System (2ed, Butterworths, 
Wellington 1998) 124. 
18 Keith Jackson "Parliament" in Raymond Miller (ed) New Zealand -Government and Politics 
(University Press, Oxford, 2001 ) 76, 77 . 
19 Pickin v British Railway Board [1974] AC 765, 789 Lord Morris. 
2° Cheney v Conn [1968] 1 All ER 779, 782. 
9 
If there are two conflicting statutes, the principle of implied repeal guarantees 
that the latest expression of Parliament's will prevails: lex posterior derogat priori 
or leges posteriores priores contrarias abrogant. Where possible, the courts try to 
reconcile the differences in the two acts, for example by confining each to its 
individual sphere of operation; however, where this is not possible, the later 
legislation is favoured. 21 
21 Morag McDowell and Duncan Webb The New Zealand Legal System (2ed, Butterworths, 
Wellington 1998) 126. 
10 
III ANALYSIS 
A Theoretical Approach 
The doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty raises some logical questions. 
1 Paradox 
Either Parliament is all-powerful or it is not. Full power includes the power to 
destroy or limit its own power. But if Parliament limits its power, it is no longer all-
powerful. In short, the paradox is that Parliament is all-powerful, yet powerless to 
limit its powers.22 
The principle of implied repeal could be taken as an example for the paradox . 
If Parliament is all-powerful, it could exclude implied or even express repeal of an 
act. On the other hand, Parliament cannot exclude repeal for two reasons: first , 
because of the principle that Parliament cannot bind its successors,23 and secondly 
due to the principle of implied repeal. 
Dicey thought the paradox was verbal only and therefore resolved that 
"limited sovereignty ... is a contradiction in terms." 24 He continued:
25 
[E]very attempt to tie the hands of [a sovereign 
legislature] breaks down, on the logical and practical 
impossibility of combining absolute legislative authority 
with restrictions on that authority which, if valid, would 
make it cease to be absolute. 
22 Philip A Joseph Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand (2ed, Brookers, 
Wellington, 2001) 480. 
23 Compare: Vauxhall Estates Limited v Liverpool Corporation [1932] l KB 733; Ellen Street 
Estates Limited v Minister of Health [ 193-+] 1 KB 590 (CA) . 
24 Albert Venn Dicey Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution ( lOed, 1885; reprinted: 
Macmillan & Co, London, 1959) 61. 
25 Dicey, above, 61. 
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But this is paradoxical and circular: Absolute power cannot be restricted 
because then the power would not be absolute.
26 
Even Neo-Diceyans dismiss the paradox as verbal only. 0 Hood Phillips 
quoted Blackstone, who explained that: 27 
Because the legislature, being in truth the sovereign 
power, is always of equal , always of absolute authority: it 
acknowledges no superior upon earth, which the prior 
legislature must have been, if its ordinances could bind a 
subsequent Parliament. 
Accordingly, he argues that Parliament is not disabled from enacting 
unchangeable legislation, only that a later Parliament, being of equal and absolute 
authority, would not be bound. But this is contradictory as well : "unchangeable 
legislation" cannot describe a statute that a subsequent Parliament is free to change. 
Therefore, the question remains why Parliament is powerless to fetter its 
freedom. 28 Dicey asserted that "The logical reason why Parliament has failed in its 
endeavours to enact unchangeable enactments is that a sovereign power cannot, 
while retaining its sovereign character, restrict its own powers by any particular 
enactment."29 But Parliament need not remain sovereign. 
The concept of parliamentary sovereignty is, therefore, founded on paradox 
and circular reasoning. 30 
26 Philip A Joseph Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand (2ed, Brookers, 
Wellington, 2001) 480. 
27 William Blackstone Commentaries on the Laws of England, Volume 1 (15ed, Cadell & 
Butterworth, London, 1809) 90; 0 Hood Phillips and Paul Jackson O Hood Phillips ' Constitutional 
and Administrative Law (7ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1987) 61 . 
28 Joseph, above, 481. 
29 Albert Venn Dicey Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution ( lOed, 1885 ; reprinted : 
Macmillan & Co, London, 1959) 68. 
3° Compare: Joseph, above, 480. 
12 
2 Unchangeable legislation 
If there is unchangeable legislation, this would mean that the principle that 
Parliament cannot bind its successors is wrong. 
(a) Independence 
Britain's post-war independence legislation relinquished all Westminster law-
making power over its former dependent territories, as it has been the practice for 
post-1960 independence legislation to provide that no future United Kingdom 
statute "shall extend or be deemed to extend to" the independent country as part of 
its law.31 
Legislation that reasserted plenary powers over its former territories may have 
the force of law in the United Kingdom, but it would be of no effect in the former 
territories that won independence,32 except on request of the former territory. 
In earlier time it was suggested that prov1s10ns conferring legislative 
independence could be revoked by Parliament,
33 but the reality is that the 
conferment of independence is an irreversible process, as "freedom once conferred 
cannot be revoked"34. 
But even if the independence was revoked, Parliament restricts the 
geographical area of effective legislation and therefore binds future Parliaments.
35 
31 John Eekelaar 'The Death of Parliamentary Sovereignty - A Comment" (1997) 113 LQR 185, 
186. 
32 Compare: Philip A Joseph Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand (2ed, Brookers, 
Wellington, 2001) 482. 
33 British Coal C01poration v R [1935] AC 500, 520. 
34 lbralebbe v R [1964] AC 900; Philip A Joseph Constitutional and Administrative Law in New 
Zealand (2ed, Brookers, Wellington, 2001) 481. 
35 A W Bradley "The Sovereignty of Parliament - in Perpetuity ?" in Jeffrey Jowell and Dawn 
Oliver (eds) The Changing Constitution (3ed, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1994) 79, 88. 
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(b) Composition of the Parliament 
Parliament may also bind its successors by altering the rules for the 
composition of the Parliament. For example in 1832, when United Kingdom 
Parliament reformed the House of Commons to secure more democratic 
representation, succeeding Parliaments were bound by that legislation inasmuch as 
the only lawful House of Commons was one elected in accordance with the 1832 
Act. 36 The composition of the Parliament could again be changed by an act, but this 
would have no effect on the Parliament that passed this act. 
( c) Assessment 
Contrary to the legal doctrine, some legislation is irreversible and 
unchangeable.37 Therefore, the principle that Parliament cannot bind its successors 
is at least an "over-simplification"38, or, in my opinion, in this generality wrong. 
3 Assessment 
As proven above, the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty is a paradox and 
founded on circular reasoning. Furthermore, the principle of the doctrine that 
Parliament cannot bind its successor is not correct. Therefore, the question is what 
of the doctrine remains ? 
The principle that Parliament is the highest Jaw-making power is the 
definition of the modem democratic Parliament - with or without the application of 
the doctrine. The term Parliament is defined in dictionaries as "the highest 
Jegislature"39 or "the highest law-making authority in a country"
40
. Whether 
Parliament can make any law it desires, depends on the existence of supreme law. If 
36 EC S Wade and AW Bradley Constitutional and Administrative Law (lled, Longman. London 
and New York, 1993) 78. 
37 Compare: Philip A Joseph Constitutional and Admi11istrative Law in New Zealand (2ed, Brookers, 
Wellington, 2001) 481. 
38 EC S Wade and AW Bradley Constitutional and Administrative Law ( lled, Longman, London 
and New York, 1993) 77. 
39 Della Thompson (ed) The Concise Oxford Dictionary (9ed, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1995). 
40 Diana Treffry and Sheila Ferguson (eds) Collins Paperback English Dictionary (4ed, 
HarperCollins, Glasgow, 2001). 
14 
there is supreme law, Parliament can make all law within its competence, that 
means all law which does not contravene the supreme law. If there is no supreme 
law, Parliament's competence is insofar not limited. But that is pure logic and not 
surpnsmg. 
The principle that Parliament's legislation must not be challenged, remains 
logically untouched and is a possible consequence of the separation of the three 
branches of government. 
On the one hand, there is legislation which is unchangeable - thus, the 
principle that Parliament cannot bind its successors is wrong. On the other hand, all 
other legislation is changeable by the Parliament's successor. But again, that is 
logical and not spectacular. 
The principle of implied repeal is the consequence of the principle that 
Parliament cannot bind its successors and the principle that Parliament is the highest 
law-making body. If Parliament wishes to change an act of Parliament, it can do so 
in express words. If Parliament does not use express words, it is for the courts to 
interpret Parliament's intention. 
Therefore in my opinion, after having eliminated the illogical elements of the 
doctrine, the remaining elements of the doctrine's principles are based on the 
common definition of the term Parliament and the constitutional decisions whether 
there is supreme law and whether courts have the power to strike down legislation 
which is inconsistent with this supreme law. 
15 
B Historical Approach 
1 The origin 
Thomas Hobbes of Magdalen Hall explained to a country weary of civil wars 
that its sole hope of salvation lay in complete submission to Leviathan, described as 
absolute, indivisible, unaccountable and unlimited. 41 
Having read Locke and Hobbes, this tale was taken up by Blackstone, who 
asserted "What the parliament doth, no power on earth can undo".42 But he 
reprobated those who talked about "the omnipotence of Parliament" for using "a 
figure rather too bold"43 and expressed his doubts:44 
Lastly, acts of parliament that are impossible to be 
performed are of no validity: and if there arise out of them 
collaterally any absurd consequences, manifestly 
contradictory to common reason, they are, with regard to 
those collateral consequences, void. 
Albert Venn Dicey developed Blackstone ' s two assertions by stating that 
Parliament has "the right to make or unmake any law whatever"
45
, and that no 
person or body has the power to set its acts aside. 
But neither Blackstone nor Dicey could produce authority to their statements. 
Dicey declared that the doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty was the law, and 
considered any doubts "obsolete", with the result that Dicey's views became 
"orthodox" .46 
4 1 R F V Heuston Essays in Constitutional Law (2ed, Stevens & Sons, London, 1964) l ; Paul 
McHugh "Sovereignty this Century - Maori and the Common Law Constitution" (2000) 31 
VUWLR 187, 192. 
42 Sir William Blackstone Commentaries on the Laws of England - Volume 1 (9ed, London, 1783; 
reprinted: Garland Publishing, New York, London, 1978) 161. 
43 Blackstone, above, 161. 
44 Blacks tone, above, 91 . 
45 Albert Venn Dicey Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (lOed, 1885 ; reprinted: 
Macmillan & Co, London, 1959) 7 1. 
46 Ivor Jennings The Law and the Constitution (5ed, Uni versity of London Press, 1959) 319. 
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Other Oxford men who subscribed to the doctrine were Sir William Anson, 
James Bryce, Sir Thomas Erskine Holland and William Geldart.47 
Some writers suggest that Lord Coke stated the doctrine of parliamentary 
sovereignty, but this assertion goes back to a wrong interpretation of Dicey' s 
quotation of Blackstone, who quoted Coke.48 
2 Judges in the last centuries 
English judges did not always uncritically subscribe to the doctrine of 
parliamentary sovereignty, especially not to the principle that Parliament 's 
legislation must not be challenged. 
In Dr Bonham's celebrated case in 1610, Coke CJ declared: 49 
[I]t appears in our books, that in many cases, the common 
law will control Acts of Parliament, and sometimes 
adjudge them to be utterly void: for when an Act of 
Parliament is against common right and reason, or 
repugnant, or impossible to be performed, the common 
law will control it, and adjudge such Act to be void . 
Although a cautious approach should be taken in determining what exactly 
Coke CJ meant by this passage,50 one view of this statement it that it asserts the 
supremacy of fundamental Jaw over statute law; the other view is that the statement 
is merely a statement about statutory interpretation. 
However, Coke's successor, Sir Henry Hobart CJ, affirmed Cook' s decision 
in 1614 and held that "even an Act of Parliament, made against natural equity, as to 
make a man a judge in his own case, is void in itself'51. 
47 RF V Heuston Essays in Constitutional Law (2ed, Stevens & Sons. London, 1964) 3 - 5. 
48 lvor Jennings The Law and the Constitution (5ed, University of London Press, 1959) 318. 
49 Bonham 's Case [1610] 8 Co Rep 107a, 118a; 77 ER 638, 652. 
50 Philip Allott "The Courts and Parliament: Who Whom ?" [1979] CLJ 79 , 83. 
51 Day v Savage [1615] Hobart 85 , 97 ; 80 ER 235 ; Lord Sheffield v Ratcliffe [1615] Hobart 334; 80 
ER 475 . 
17 
This view was supported by Vaughan CJ in 1674,52 and endorsed by Holt CJ 
who thought in 1701:53 
What may Lord Coke says in Dr Bonham's Case in his 8 
Co is far from any extravagancy, for it is a very 
reasonable and true saying that if an Act of Parliament 
should ordain that the same person should be party and 
Judge, or, which is the same thing, Judge in his own 
cause, it would be a void Act of Parliament. 
Cook's doctrine was acted upon as late as 1795.54 Echoes of the doctrine 
sounded even in 1861,55 but thereafter it fell into abeyance.56 
It must be acknowledged that these dicta have been overwhelmed by the 
weight of subsequent judicial practise and repeated authority disavowing anything 
other than a subservient role for the judiciary.57 
Nevertheless, for example Willes J proclaimed in his much-quoted refutation 
of Coke's dictum in 1871 that Coke's doctrine stands as a warning rather than an 
authority to be followed. 58 But E W Thomas concluded that even the expression of 
a judicial warning would seem to presuppose that the capacity to act in defiance of 
Parliament has not been forever foreclosed .59 In my opinion, this is convincing -
otherwise it would be a somewhat empty warning. 
52 Thomas v Sorrell [1674) Vaughan 330; 124 ER 1098. 
53 City of London v Wood [1701) 12 Mod 669, 687; 88 ER 1592, 1602. 
54 R v Inhabitants oftlze County of Cumberland [1795] 6 TR 194; 101 ER 507. 
55 Green v Mortimer [1861) 3 LT 642. 
56 Philip A Joseph Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand (2ed, Brookers, 
Wellington, 2001) 463. 
57 E W Thomas "The Relationship of Parliament and the Courts: A Tentative Thought or Two for the 
New Millennium" (2000) 31 VUWLR 18. 
58 Lee v Bude & Tarring ton Railway Co [ 1871] LR 6 CP 576, 582, Willes J. 
59 Thomas, above, 18. 
18 
3 Scholars in the last centuries 
As mentioned above, William Blackstone agonised over the idea of an 
omnipotent power and thought that the phrase "the omnipotence of Parliament ... a 
figure rather too bold".60 
Albert Venn Dicey was much less self-doubting as his sole reference to 
Bonham's Case was a dismissive footnote declaring it "obsolete"61 . Dicey 
entertained no exception to Parliament's absolute powers of legislation.62 
Diceyan positivism left little place for critical thinking about the law-making 
process, although it was occasionally questioned what happened to "thousand years 
of talk about 'fundamental law' by kings, judges, political men and 
commentators"63 . 
4 New Zealand 
The adoption of the Statute of Westminster 1931 (UK), removed any 
limitation on New Zealand to pass legislation that was repugnant to English law, 
and in 1947 Parliament acquired full power to alter its constituent statute, the New 
Zealand Constitution Act 1852 (UK). 
It was, however, not before 1973, that the New Zealand Constitution 
Amendment Act 1973 removed a perceived extraterritorial limitation in 
Parliament's powers.64 In R v Fineberg, 65 Moller J held that this limitation arose 
from the legislative power to pass laws for the "peace, order and good government 
of New Zealand" according to section 53 of the New Zealand Constitution Act 1852 
60 Sir William Blackstone Commentaries on the Laws of England - Volume 1 (9ed, London, 1783; 
reprinted: Garland Publishing, New York, London, 1978) 161. 
61 Albert Venn Dicey Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (lOed, 1885; reprinted: 
Macmillan & Co, London, 1959) 61. 
62 Philip A Joseph Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand (2ed, Brookers, 
Wellington, 2001) 463. 
63 Philip Allott "The Courts and Parliament: Who Whom?" [1979] CLJ 79, 114. 
64 Joseph, above, 476 and 489. 
65 R v Fineberg [1968] NZLR 119. 
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(UK). The 1973 amendment Act superimposed the legislative power to pass laws 
also having effect outside New Zealand.66 
5 Assessment 
R F V Heuston drew the conclusion that the doctrine was established "more 
by a series of obiter dicta by eminent persons, whether sitting on the Bench or in the 
professorial study, than by any clear judicial decision of binding authority"67 . 
Sir Ivor Jennings thought the doctrine was the work of text-book writers 
flirting with political philosophy, none of whom could produce authority for their 
statement. 68 
Similarly, Philip Allott suggests that the idea of the sovereignty of Parliament 
is the product of three things: first, an inadequate view of what has been achieved 
by the British constitution before 1600, secondly a distorted view of the outcome of 
the constitutional struggle of the seventeenth century in the Revolution of 1688 / 
1689 and thirdly, a distorting intrusion into British constitutional theory of a 
particular tradition of general political thought, namely sovereignty theory.69 
In my op1mon, the mam explanation for the existence of the doctrine of 
parliamentary sovereignty is that Dicey' s Introduction to the Study of the Law of 
the Constitution was a well-written, basic book of the English constitutional law.70 
Dicey's just boldly asserted that parliamentary sovereignty was the law without 
devoting so much as a line to demonstrate that this was so - the oracle spoke, and 
came to be accepted. 71 
66 Philip A Joseph Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand (2ed, Brookers, 
Wellington, 2001) 476. 
67 RF V Heuston Essays in Constitutional Law (2ed, Stevens, London, 1964) 1. 
68 Ivor Jennings The Law and the Constitution (5ed, University of London Press, 1959) 320, 328. 
69 Philip Allott "The Courts and Parliament: Who Whom?" (1979] CLJ 79, 102. 
70 AW B Simpson "The Common Law and Legal Theory" in AW B Simpson (ed) Oxford Essays in 
Jurisprudence (second series) (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1973) 77. 
71 Simpson, above, 77 . 
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It therefore can be said that the ongm of the doctrine is at least doubtful. 
Nevertheless, a constitution is not static - it develops with the history of the country 
and its people.72 
C Contemporary Approach In Different Countries 
In the following, some features of the constitutions of New Zealand and the 
United Kingdom, the motherland of the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, will 
be examined and compared with the German constitution, where the doctrine is 
unknown. 
1 New Zealand 
Parliament's legislative sovereignty has been described as the ultimate 
principle of New Zealand's constitution.73 Therefore, New Zealand Parliament's 
power are deemed absolute and illimitable.74 
There are, however, some issues which raise doubts about this view. 
(a) Fundamental common law rights 
Similar to Murphy J's concept of "fundamental implied rights" in Australia,75 
Lord Cooke of Thomdon 76 questioned whether Parliament had the power to 
override fundamental common law rights. These attempts at reviving the Bonham 
doctrine present a direct attack on the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. 
72 Sian Elias "The Treaty of Waitangi and the Separation of Powers in New Zealand" in B D Gray 
and R B McClintock (eds) Courts Policy: Checking the Balance (Brookers, Wellington, 1995) 206, 
223. 
73 E W Thomas "The Relationship of Parliament and the Courts: A Tentative Thought or Two for the 
New Millennium" (2000) 31 VUWLR 14. 
74 Philip Joseph "The Legal History and Framework of the Constitution" in Colin James (ed) 
Building the Constitution (Institute of Policy Studies, Wellington, 2000) 168, 174. 
75 Murphy J pioneered Australia 's implied rights jurisprudence during his term as Judge of the High 
Court of Australia (1975 - 1986). In a series of cases, he sought to infer from the structure and 
context of the Constitution a bill of rights. 
76 Former Cooke J and Hon Sir Robin Cooke. 
In 1979, Lord Cooke of Thomdon stated: 77 
It would be a strong and strange step for Parliament to 
attempt to confer on a body other than the Courts power 
to determine conclusively whether or not actions in the 
courts are barred. There is even room for doubt whether 
Parliament could constitutionally do so. 
Eighteen months later, he reasoned that:78 
It may be added that the recognition by the common law 
of the supremacy of Parliament can hardly be regarded as 
given on the footing that Parliament would abdicate its 
function. It is not to be supposed that by the [Economic 
Stabilisation Act 1948] the New Zealand Parliament 
meant to abandon the entire field of the economy to the 
Executive. 
In 1982, two colleagues joined Lord Cooke of Thom don in noting: 79 
Indeed we have reservations as to the extent to which in 
New Zealand even an act of Parliament can take away the 
rights of citizens to resort to the ordinary courts of law for 
the determination of their rights . 
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The following year, Lord Cooke of Thomdon states that "it is arguable 
whether some common law rights may go so deep that even Parliament cannot be 
accepted by the Courts to have destroyed them."80 
Many lawyers were reluctant to accept these warnings but no attempt at 
"reading down" the dicta could obscure the author' s purpose following Taylor v NZ 
Poultry Boarcfl in 1984. Before Taylor, the dicta were cautiously expressed as 
"reservations", or through such terminologies as "it is arguable" and "there is even 
77 L v M [1979] 2 NZLR 519, 527 (CA) Coke J. 
78 Brader v Ministry of Transport [1981] 1 NZLR 73, 78 (CA) Coke J. 
79 New Zealand Drivers ' Association v New Zealand Road Carriers [1982] l NZLR 374, 390 (CA) 
Cooke, McMullin and Ongley JJ . 
8° Fraser v State Services Commission [1984] l NZLR 116, 121 (CA) Cooke J. 
81 Taylor v NZ Poultry Board [ 1984] 1 NZLR 394 (CA). 
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room for doubt". Taylor's case, however, removed any ambiguity, as Lord Cooke 
stated: 82 
I do not think that literal compulsion, by torture for 
instance, would be within the lawful powers of 
Parliament. Some common law rights presumably lie so 
deep that even Parliament could not override them. 
Lord Cooke of Thorndon's dicta have not caused the constitutional ructions 
that some commentators feared, as until today no court has invalidated or disapplied 
a statute for encroaching on common law rights in express words.83 
Writing extra-judicially in 1988, Lord Cooke of Thorndon stated that the 
modern common law was "built on two complementary and lawfully unalterable 
principles: the operation of a democratic legislature and the operation of 
independent courts"84 . He added: 85 
I am suggesting that if a change, by legislation or 
otherwise, were seen to undermine either of them to a 
significant extent, it would be the responsibility of the 
Judges to say so and, if their judgements to that effect 
were disregarded, to resign or to acknowledge frankly that 
they are prepared to depart form their judicial oath and to 
serve a state not entitled to be called a free democracy. 
Suppose that an act of the legislature purported to strip Jewish people of their 
citizenship and their property, or to disfranchise women, or without qualification to 
require the Courts to receive in evidence any statement appearing to be a confession 
of crime, whether or not obtained by force or any other form of compulsion.86 
82 Taylor v NZ Poultry Board (1984] l NZLR 394, 398 (CA) Cooke J. 
83 Compare: Cooper v Attorny-General (1996] 3 NZLR 480; Re Shaw (1997] 3 NZLR 611; Shaw v 
Commissioner of Inland Revenue (1999] 3 NZLR 154 (CA); Westco Lagan Ltd v Attorney-General 
(2001] l NZLR 40. 
84 Rt Hon Sir Robin Cooke "Fundamentals" [1988] NZLJ 158, 164. 
85 Cooke, above, 164. 
86 Cooke, above, 164. 
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It is easy to say that the hypothetical examples are so unlikely that one need 
not bother about the problem - that may be so. On the other hand, one has to admit 
that the concept of a free democracy must carry with it some limitations on 
legislative power, however generous.87 
Furthermore, the imagined Act which overrides fundamental rights is not 
totally unrealistic in New Zealand, as there used to be an Economic Stabilisation 
Act 1948 which inter alia empowered the Governor-General in Council to make 
such regulations as appeared to him necessary or expedient for promoting the 
economic stability of New Zealand. Various regulations made under that power 
survived challenge, although not always unanimously.88 
The common law rights specifically referred to by Lord Cooke of Thomdon 
were the right of Courts to conclusively determine whether actions in the Courts are 
barred (L v Nr9), the right of access of citizens to the Courts for the determination 
of their rights (New Zealand Drivers' Association v New Zealand Road Carrier/°), 
the right of an office-holder to natural justice (Fraser v State Service Commission91 ) 
and the right to be free from literal compulsion by torture (Taylor v New Zealand 
Poultry Board92). 
In R (Daly) v Secretary of State for the Home Department, Lord Cooke of 
Thomdon added other fundamental rights: 93 
The truth is, I think, that some rights are inherent and 
fundamental to democratic civilised society; conventions, 
constitutions, bills of rights and the like respond by 
recognising rather than creating them .... It is enough to 
take the three identified by Lord Bingham: in his words, 
access to courts; access to legal advise; and the right to 
87 Rt Hon Sir Robin Cooke "Fundamentals" (1988) NZLJ 158, 164. 
88 For example: New Zealand Drivers ' Association v New Zealand Road Carriers [ 1982) 1 NZLR 
374. 
89 L v M (1979) 2 NZLR 519, 527 (CA) Cooke J. 
90 New Zealand Drivers ' Association v New Zealand Road Carriers (1982) 1 NZLR 374, 390 (CA) 
Cooke J. 
91 Fraser v State Service Commission [ 1984] 1 NZLR 116, 121 (CA) Cooke J. 
92 Taylor v New Zealand Poultry Board (1984) 1 NZLR 394 (CA) Cooke J. 
93 R (Daly) v Secreta,y of State for the Home Department (2001) 2 WLR 1622, 1636 (HL) Lord 
Cooke. 
communicate confidentially with a legal adviser under the 
seal of legal professional privilege; as he says 
authoritatively from the woolsack, such rights may be 
curtailed only be clear and express words, and then only 
to the extent reasonably necessary to meet the ends which 
justify the curtailment; the point that I am emphasising is 
that the common law goes so deep. 
(b) Interpretation 
24 
In TV 3 Network Ltd v Eveready New Zealand Ltd,94 the Court of Appeal was 
required to ascertain whether it had power to grant a mandatory injunction ordering 
corrective advertising in malicious defamation proceedings. Although this power 
has never been recognised, the Court concluded that it did have such power, to be 
exercised in appropriate circumstances. The interesting point is, that this decision 
was reached notwithstanding the fact that in the new Defamation Act 1992, which 
did not apply to these proceedings because the action arose prior to the legislation 
being in force, the power to order correction was reduced from a mandatory order, 
to a recommendatory order only.95 Therefore, the decision of the Court of Appeal 
illustrates arguably a type of judicial law-making that is inconsistent with 
parliamentary will. 
In Simpson v Attorney-General [Baigent's Casej,96 following the Privy 
Council's decision Maharaj v Attorney-General of Trinidad and Tobago (No 2),97 a 
majority of the New Zealand Court of Appeal held that a breach of the Bill of 
Rights Act 1990 gives rise to a new civil cause action in public law which lies 
directly against the Crown and may, at the Court's discretion, attract a remedy in 
the form of an award of monetary compensation, despite the remedies provision 
having been specifically removed from the Bill. This decision was heavily criticised 
as the history, legal form and overall structure of the Bill of Rights Act 1990 
demonstrate beyond doubt that Parliament did not intend the Bill to form part of an 
94 TV 3 New Zealand Ltd v Eveready New Zealand Ltd [1993] 3 NZLR 435. 
95 Compare: Morag McDowell and Duncan Webb The New Zealand Legal System (2ed, 
Butterworths, Wellington 1998) 124. 
96 Simpson v Anorney-General [Baigent's Case] [1994] 3 NZLR 667. 
97 Maharaj v Attorney-General of Trinidad and Tobago (No 2) [1979] AC 485. 
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over-arching constitution and, in particular, did not intend to confer power on the 
courts to create a new regime of public civil liability untouched by existing 
statutory immunities.98 
Another recent example is R v Pora99. A seven member bench was unanimous 
in allowing Pora' s appeal against a 13-year minimum non-parole period imposed 
under the purportedly retrospective arm of the so-called "home invasion" 
legislation; all members held that the legislation was not retrospective beyond 1 
September 1993, when the power to impose minimum non-parole periods were first 
conferred. 100 The Bench split, however, three to three - with the abstention of the 
President - on whether the legislation had any retrospective effect at all. The issue 
was whether the purportedly retrospective provision, section 2 (4) of the Criminal 
Justice Amendment Act (No 2) 1999, prevailed over the anti-retrospective 
protection in section 4 (2) of the Criminal Justice Act 1985. The Chief Justice 
Tipping and Thomas JJ held that, to the extent of an inconsistency, section 4 (2) of 
the Criminal Justice Act 1985 prevailed over section 2 (4) of the Criminal Justice 
Amendment Act (No 2) 1999, Gault, Keith and McGrath JJ held the opposite. Elias 
CJ suggested Parliament simply did not understand what it was doing when it 
passed section 2 (4) of the Criminal Justice Amendment Act (No 2) 1999 - it was 
implausible to believe Parliament would knowingly act in breach of the Bi]] of 
Rights Act 1990 and its international obligations. In her view, this did not erode 
parliamentary sovereignty because the enactment of section 2 (4) of the Criminal 
Justice Amendment Act (No 2) 1999 by Parliament was not a dear expression of 
intention to derogate from section 4 (2) of the Criminal Justice Act 1985. Thomas 
J' s same result was mandated by a rights-centred approach to interpretation, which 
in his opinion the court in the modern era should choose to adopt. He contends that 
such an interpretative model does not chaJlenge Parliament's supremacy, rather, "it 
provides a barrier against inadvertent legislation which would have the effect of 
abridging human rights". Whether or not this decision is incompatible with the 
98 Compare: J A Smillie "'Fundamental' Rights, Parliamentary Supremacy and the New Zealand 
Court of Appeal" (1995) 111 LQR 209, 213; James Allen "No to a Written Constitution" in Colin 
James (ed) Building the Constitution (Institute of Policy Studies, Wellington, 2000) 391,394. 
99 R v Pora [2001] 2 NZLR 37. 
100 Daniel Kalderimis "R v Pora" (2001) NZLJ 369. 
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doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, mainly because of not applying the principle 
of implied repeal, is in dispute. 101 
( c) Privy Council 
In Buxoo v Rex102 , the Privy Council dismissed an appeal from Mauritius on 
traditional principles for the tendering of advice in criminal appeals. Such appeals 
may be presented only with special leave granted by Her Majesty on the advice of 
the Privy Council 103 , which will be given only in exceptional cases of serious 
miscarriage of justice. 104 However, a Mauritius statute had made Privy Council 
appeals in criminal cases "as of right". The Privy Council avoided these words by 
holding that the Mauritius Parliament had not intended to dictate to their Lordships 
the principles governing the disposal of appeals. But had the statute purported to do 
so, "a serious question would have arisen as to whether the Board were bound to 
give effect to the enactment, in so far as it purported to bring about a departure from 
the traditional principles" 105 . Lord Keith of Kinkel further said: 106 
[T]he Board would not easily be persuaded that their 
function of tendering advice to Her Majesty was capable 
of being fettered by the legislature of any of the countries 
where the jurisdiction of Her Majesty in Council is 
accepted . 
Although the issue in Buxoo arose under Mauritius law, Privy Council 
decisions involving general principles of law are binding in all jurisdictions 
retaining the appeaI. 107 The decision therefore suggests that New Zealand lacks 
plenary powers when it legislates for its judicial system. 108 
101 On one hand: Anita Killeen, Richard Ekins and John Ip "Undermining the Grundnorm ?" (2001) 
NZLJ 299 - 308; on the other hand: Daniel Kalderimis "R v Pora" (2001) NZLJ 369- 371. 
102 Buxoo v R [1988] 1 WLR 820 (PC). 
103 Oteri v R [1976] l WLR 1272 (PC); Holder v R [1980] AC 115 (PC). 
104 Ex parte Macrea [1893] AC 346 (PC). 
105 Buxoo v Rex, above, 823 Lord Keith. 
106 Buxoo v Rex. above, 823 Lord Keith . 
107 Tai Hing Cotton Mill Ltd v Liu Chong Hing Bank Ltd [1986] AC 80 (PC). 
108 Compare: Philip A Joseph Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand (2ed, 
Brookers, Wellington, 2001) 487. 
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(d) Entrenched legislation in section 268 of the Electoral Act 1993 
Any law in New Zealand may be altered by the simple majority of Parliament, 
except certain reserved provisions under section 268 of the Electoral Act 1993 
which are entrenched. Section 268 of the Electoral Act 1993 entrenches section 17, 
which provides that a general election must be held at least every three years, by a 
majority of votes at a poll of electors or a 75 % majority vote of all the members of 
the House of Representatives in order to amend or repeal the section. This special 
amending procedure extends also to five other provisions under of the Electoral Act 
1993 relating to the Representation Commission, section 28, the division of New 
Zealand into electoral districts after each census, section 35, the adjustment of the 
quota, section 36, and the minimum voting age of 18 years, section 74. 
Section 268 is singly and not doubly entrenched. From a legal point of view, 
this means that the entrenching provision itself could be amended or repealed by an 
ordinary Act of Parliament. 109 Nevertheless , even single entrenchment can rise to 
the political fact that the entrenching provision can only be amended by a special 
majority. Or in Lord Cooke of Thomdon's words, to amend or repeal an 
entrenching provision by an ordinary act of Parliament is "theoretically doubtful 
and practically unthinkable". 110 
Regarding the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, it 1s questionable 
whether Parliament can successfully bind a succeeding Parliament by the "manner 
and form" of legislation, particularly by this special procedures of law-making. 
Earlier constitutional theorists rejected entrenchment or at least double 
entrenchment, which means that the entrenching section itself is entrenched and 
protected from ordinary repeal , as an attempt to bind a later Parliament. 111 This 
view is derived from Dicey who stated: 11 2 
109 Philip Joseph "The Legal History and Framework of the Constitution" in Colin James (ed) 
Building the Constitution (Institute of Policy Studies, Wellington, 2000) 168, 169. 
110 Lord Cooke of Thorndon "The Role of the Judges" in Colin James (ed) Building the Constitution 
(Institute of Policy Studies, Wellington, 2000) 371, 372. 
111 Compare: Joseph, above, 174. 
11 2 Albert Venn Dicey Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution ( lOed, 1885 ; 
reprinted: Macmillan & Co, London, 1959) 88. 
There is no law which Parliament cannot change, or (to 
put the same things somewhat different), fundamental or 
so-called constitutional laws are under our constitution 
changed by the same body and in the same manner as 
other laws, namely, by Parliament acting in its ordinary 
legislative character. 
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This Diceyan view was rejected in the cases Attorney-General v 
T h JJJ H . D.. ll4 dB 'b C . . R . h n s ret owan , arns v onges an n ery ommzsszoner v anasmg e . 
Although commentators have sought to argue that these decisions depended 
upon special constitutional circumstances and do not establish a general rule, the 
decisions have worked to weaken Dicey' s proposition that a hallmark of sovereign 
Parliament is that it can repeal all statutes with a simple majority. 116 
Later theorists , sometimes referred to as the "manner and form school", 
reinterpreted the doctrine to a "new view" and drew the distinction between the 
powers of Parliament, and the procedures of Jaw-making that it adopt. While 
Parliament cannot create legislative vacuums concerning the substance of 
legislation, which means that Parliament cannot enact unchangeable legislation, it 
can redefine itself through the procedures of legislation it adopts for ad hoe 
purposes. 11 7 
In my opinion, at least from a purist point of view, it is doubtful whether any 
entrenchment is compatible with the doctrine 's principle that parliament cannot 
bind its successor. At least regarding the procedure, Parliament is bound by its 
predecessors. Furthermore, if the requirements of the procedure is high enough, this 
threshold can bind the next Parliament, de facto even substantially. 
11 3 Attorn ey-General of New South Wales v Trethowan (1932] AC 526 (PC). 
11 4 Harris v Donges [1952] l TLR 1245 , 1259. 
11 5 Bribery Commissioner v Ranasinghe [1965] AC 172, 197. 
116 Daniel Kalderirnis "R v Pora" (2001 ) NZLJ 369, 370. 
117 Compare: Philip Joseph "The Legal History and Framework of the Constitution" in Colin James 
( ed) Building the Constitution (Institute of Policy Studies, Wellington, 2000) 168, 174. 
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(e) New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 
In 1985, the Labour Government released a 'White Paper' that proposed a 
superior bill of rights, but the Parliamentary Select Committee that heard public 
submissions around the country recommended in 1988 that it not proceed for · lack 
of public support. The Committee recommended that a bill of rights be enacted as 
ordinary statute, which means, not as supreme law and hence not capable of 
rendering other parliamentary laws invalid. In August 1990, the New Zealand Bill 
of Rights Act 1990 was duly enacted. 
However, today's New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 is an ordinary statute, 
and not entrenched Jaw. This means that sufficiently clear legislation passed by 
ordinary acts of Parliament and possibly very speedily in the absence of a second 
House can override the Bill of Rights. 118 Therefore the Act is regarded 
internationally as one of the weakest affirmations on human rights.
119 
The assessment of the Bill of Rights differs. Some consider the New Zealand 
Bill of Rights Act 1990 as an ideal precedent for a Bill of Rights since it is in accord 
with the democratic and parliamentary traditions and the doctrine of parliamentary 
sovereignty. 120 Others ask: "If one genuinely believes in the abiding value of the 
rights and freedoms proclaimed, as distinct from paying lip service to them, how 
. 1 . h . h ?" 121 can one consistent y reJect t e1r entrenc ment . 
Furthermore, New Zealand is already, ethically if not strictly legally, in 
breach of its international obligations. The Human Rights Committee of the United 
Nations, composed of jurists of the highest standing, released the following 
damning statement on the Bill of Rights Act:
122 
The Committee regrets that the prov1s1ons of the 
Covenant have not been fully incorporated into domestic 
11 8 Lord Cooke of Thorndon "The Role of the Judges" in Colin James (ed) Building the Constitution 
(Institute of Policy Studies, Wellington, 2000) 371 , 373. 
119 Lord Cooke, above, 373. 
120 Rt Hon Lord Woolf of Barnes "Droit Public - English Style" [ 1995] PL 57, 70. 
121 Rt Hon Sir Robin Cooke "Fundamentals" [1988] NZLJ 158, 159. 
122 Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: New Zealand (3 October 1995) 
CCPR IC /79 I Add 47, 176. 
law and given overriding status in the legal system. 
Article 2, paragraph 2, of the Covenant requires state 
parties to take such legislative or other measures which 
may be necessary to give effect to the rights recognised 
in the Covenant. In this regard the Committee regrets 
that certain rights guaranteed under the Covenant are not 
reflected in the Bill of Rights and that it does not repeal 
earlier inconsistent legislation and has no higher status 
than ordinary legislation. The Committee notes that it is 
expressly possible, under the terms of the Bill of Rights 
to enact legislation contrary to its provisions and regrets 
that this appears to have been done in a few cases. 
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Furthermore, the Bill of Rights Act 1990 is one of the weakest pieces of 
legislation. In order to get it passed through the legislature, the original version was 
watered down by the inclusion of section 4 so that the Bill of Rights Act 1990 loses 
to all other conflicting statutes. The courts are instructed that even prior enactments 
are not be held to be impliedly repealed or revoked, or in any way invalid, 
ineffective or inapplicable by reason of inconsistency with the Bill of Rights Act.
123 
Therefore, the principal of implied repeal does not apply to this Act. 
Nevertheless, section 4 restrains Parliament in two ways. Through recognition 
by Parliament of the legal values that underpin the rights and freedoms affirmed, 
and through the Attorney-General ' s reporting function under section 7 of the Bill of 
Rights Act. In submitting legislative proposals to Cabinet, Ministers must state 
whether their proposal complies with the Bill of Rights and give reasons if the 
proposals does not comply. 124 The Attorney-General must report to the House any 
bill that, in his or her opinion cannot reasonably be reconciled wit the rights or 
freedoms affirmed. This prospect of an adverse report operates as a practical 
disincentive to infringing legislation.
125 
123 James Allen "No to a Written Constitution" in Colin James (ed) Building the Constitution 
(Institute of Policy Studies, Wellington, 2000) 391, 394. 
124 Cabinet Office Cabinet Manual 2001 (Cabinet Office, Wellington, 2001 ) 5.36. 
125 Philip A Joseph Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand (2ed, Brookers, 
Wellington, 2001) 506. 
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While the Bill of Rights Act 1990 was certainly not designed to have this 
effect and nothing was said about it at the time of its enactment, section 5 can be 
read so as to authorise a New Zealand court to state whether a statute is 
inconsistent, because is violates a right to an unreasonable degree, even though 
section 4 requires that the court must nonetheless apply the inconsistent provision. 
This happened for the fist time in the judgment of Thomas J in Quilter v Attorney-
General126 without fanfare. In Moonen v Film and Literature Board of Review
127
, 
the Court of Appeal, however, expressly affirmed its entitlement to make these 
declarations, although adding a qualifying phrase that suggested they would not 
always do so. 128 This shows that there is tendency by the judiciary that this Act 
takes on a certain higher, quasi-constitutional status even without explicit, single 
entrenchment provisions. 129 Furthermore, the prospects of such a declaration will 
practically restrain Parliament's power. 
(f) Treaty of Waitangi 
The Treaty of Waitangi is upheld as the 'founding document' of New 
Zealand's constitution. 130 It is deemed by Lord Cooke of Thorn don "a fundamental 
charter", "part of the essence of the national life" and "simply the most important 
document in New Zealand", 131 and is in Lord Woolf's view "of the greatest 
constitutional importance to New Zealand"
132
. Nevertheless, the exact legal 
standing of the Treaty is in dispute. 
The orthodox view is that native tribes lacked international legal personality 
and therefore cannot enter into international relations. The Wi Parata doctrine 
concluded that the Treaty was incapable of ceding rights of sovereignty as the 
Maori lacked international legal personality. Prendergast CJ held that, so far as the 
126 Quilter v Attorney-General [1998) l NZLR 523. 
127 Moonen v Film and Literature Board of Review[2000] 2 NZLR 9 (CA). 
128 Compare: Paul Rishworth "The Rights Debate: Can We, Should We, Adopt a Written 
Constitution Including a Bill of Rights ?" in Colin James (ed) Building the Constitution (Institute of 
Policy Studies, Wellington, 2000) 397,407. 
129 James Allen "No to a Written Constitution" in Colin James (ed) Building the Constitution 
(Institute of Policy Studies, Wellington, 2000) 391, 394. 
130 Philip Joseph ''The Legal History and Framework of the Constitution" in Colin James (ed) 
Building the Constitution (Institute of Policy Studies, Wellington, 2000) 168, 170. 
131 C ompare: Joseph, above, 170. 
132 New Zealand Maori Council v Attorney-General [1994] l NZLR 513 (PC) Lord Woolf. 
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Treaty purported to cede rights of sovereignty, it was a "simple nullity" and has no 
legal standing for enforcement in the courts other than through incorporation by 
Parliament for ad hoe legislative purposes.
133 
Other lawyers have argued that it was post-1840 doctrinal developments that 
denied the Treaty its status in international law, and the decisive time for an 
assessment was the time of the conclusion of the treaty.
134 Therefore, the Treaty is 
not a "nullity" and can be enforced in the courts. 
Whether or not enforceable in law, the Treaty was elevated in the social 
compact and repatriated within the legal order. The incorporation of the principles 
of the Treaty under recent statutes has liberated the jurisprudence from the 
deadweight of the Wi Parata doctrine. 135 Under Parliament's legislation, the courts 
have imputed to the Treaty the principle of partnership, fiduciary-like duties and 
obligations of utmost good faith, and the concept of the honour of the Crown.
136 
Thus, the Treaty of Waitangi imposes extra-legal standards for legislation for 
two reasons. When a Minister submits a bill to Cabinet's Legislation Committee for 
approval, the covering submission must indicate whether the bill complies with the 
principles of the Treaty and must provide reasons if the bill does not so comply.
137 
For publicity reasons no Minister tends to introduce a Bill not complying with the 
principles of the Treaty. Furthermore, the courts will not lightly ascribe to 
Parliament an intention to permit conduct that is inconsistent with Treaty 
principles. 138 They therefore interpret an act of Parliament in a way consistent with 
the principles of the Treaty. 
133 Wi Parata v Bishop of Wellington [1877] 3 NZ Jur (NS) SY 72, 78. 
134 Compare: Philip Joseph "The Legal History and Framework of the Constitution" in Colin James 
( ed) Building the Constitution (Institute of Policy Studies, Wellington, 2000) 168, 177. 
135 Joseph, above, 170. 
136 Paul McHugh "Sovereignty this Century - Maori and the Common Law Constitution" (2000) 31 
VUWLR 187, 190. 
137 Cabinet Office Cabinet Manual 2001 (Cabinet Office, Wellington, 2001) 5.35. 
138 NZ Maori Council v A-G [1987] l NZLR 641,655 (CA). 
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As sovereignty of Parliament is seen as "absolute, territorial, indivisible and 
unlimitable" 139, the concept of parliamentary sovereignty is increasingly seen as an 
inappropriate basis by which to secure for Maori the rights guaranteed to them 
under the Treaty and to order the relationship of the two peoples of New Zealand.
140 
A right to special status does not strike an immediate accord with the notion 
of majoritarian rule underlying the precept of parliamentary legislative 
supremacy. 141 Elias observes therefore that it is time to recognise that the notion of 
arbitrary parliamentary sovereignty represents an obsolete and inadequate idea of 
the New Zealand constitution. 142 Her conclusion is that the Treaty of Waitangi is 
part of New Zealand law and it is the duty of the courts to protect the principles 
which are fundamental to the legal order. 143 
Demands for Maori sovereignty, or separate Maori parliaments, are cases in 
point. The question was also implicit in a comment on the Tainui agreement by the 
then President of the Court of Appeal, Lord Cooke of Thorndon, in October 1989 
that "in the end, no doubt, only the courts can finally rule on whether or not a 
solution accords with the Treaty principles"144. 
The actual discussion about the status of the Treaty cannot be resolved here. 
Only the future will show how the Treaty will be interpreted. But even if the Treaty 
is deemed a "nullity", it at least imposes self-restraint on the legislation and is a rule 
for the courts how to interpret the Treaty. Therefore, the Treaty of Waitangi is at 
least a practical limit on the doctrine's omnipotence of Parliament. 
139 Paul McHugh "Sovereignty this Century - Maori and the Common Law Constitution" [2000] 31 
VUWLR 187, 194. 
140 E W Thomas "The Relationship of Parliament and the Courts : A Tentative Thought or Two for 
the New Millennium" (2000) 31 VUWLR 10. 
141 Sian Elias "The Treaty of Waitangi and the Separation of Powers in New Zealand" in B D Gray 
and RB McClintock (eds) Courts Policy: Checking the Balance (Brookers, Wellington, 1995) 206. 
142 Elias, above, 224. 
143 Elias, above, 230. 
144 Keith Jackson "Parliament" in Raymond Miller (ed) New Zealand - Government and Politics 
(University Press, Oxford, 2001) 76, 78. 
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(g) International Law 
International treaties and conventions do not have legal standing and are not 
enforceable in the courts, unless Parliament introduces legislation to adopt them 
into municipal law. 145 Parliament may legislate notwithstanding the comity of 
nations, 146 and binding international agreements.
147 No international convention, 
treaty or rule of public international law may defeat the clear meaning of a 
statute. 148 
Nevertheless, international treaty obligations and principles of customary 
international law impose extra-legal restraints: In its 1997 Report, The Treaty 
Making Process, the Law Commission pointed out that "[t]he idea of a national 
Parliament with full power to make whatever law it likes without any constraint 
from outside, was never an accurate one" as about a quarter of the public Acts 
which make up the New Zealand statute book give effect to international 
obligations. 149 
Furthermore, it is a Cabinet requirement that Ministers proposing legislation 
must vet their proposals for compliance with international law, 
150 and the courts 
apply a presumption of interpretation that Parliament does not intend to legislate in 
b h f . I 1 f bi . . 
151 If reac o mtemationa aw or speci ic treaty o 1gat1ons. a statute may 
reasonably bear more than one meaning, a court will prefer the meaning that is 
compatible with international law. 152 
In my opinion, international law, therefore, restrains Parliament ' s legislation. 
145 Philip A Joseph Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand (2ed, Brookers, 
Wellington, 2001 ) 476. 
146 Theophile v Solicitor-General [ 1950] AC 186, 195 (HL) Lord Porter. 
147 Salomon v Commissioners of Customs and Exercise [1967] 2 QB 116, 143 (CA) Diplock LJ. 
148 Philip A Joseph Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand (2ed, Brookers, 
Wellington, 2001) 504. 
149 Bill Mansfield "The Constraints of Treaties and International Law" in Colin James (ed) Building 
the Constitution (Institute of Policy Studies, Wellington, 2000) 105 , 106. 
15° Cabinet Office Cabinet Manual 2001 (Cabinet Office, Wellington, 2001) 5.35. 
151 For example: Cooke v The Charles A Vogeler Company [1901] AC 103, 107 (HL) Lord Halsbury; 
Theophile v Solicitor-General [1950] AC 186, 195 (HL) Lord Porter; Post Office v Estuary Radio 
Ltd [1968] 2 QB 740 (CA); Police v Hicks [1974] I NZLR 763 , 766 (SC) ; Van Gorkom v Attorney-
Genera [ 1977] I NZLR 535, 543 (SC) ; Ashby v Minister of Immigration [ 1981] 1 NZLR 222 (CA). 
152 Compare: Philip A Joseph Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand (2ed, 
Brookers, Wellington, 2001) 505. 
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(h) Referenda 
Parliamentary sovereignty is also called into question m the distinction 
between binding and non-binding referenda. Both have been used in New Zealand 
and are examples of direct, as opposed to representative, democracy. 
According to the terms of the Citizens' Initiated Referenda Act 1993, a person 
or group who wants to trigger a vote on any issue must first submit a proposed 
question to the clerk of the House of Representatives. The clerk then advertises this 
question and calls for submissions on how the wording should be changed. Three 
months after the original submission the clerk must have determined the final 
wording of the referendum question. The purpose of this process is to produce a 
question that is simple to understand and allows for only a "yes" or "no" answer. 
The proposer then has twelve months to collect the signatures of ten per cent of 
enrolled electors. When the petition is delivered to Parliament, the clerk' s office 
checks a random sample of pages to asses the validity of the signatures. Once the 
signatures have been checked and found to be in compliance, the Speaker presents 
the petition to Parliament. The governor-general then sets a date for the referendum 
to be held, which must be within a year of the date of presentation, unless three-
quarters of MPs vote to defer it for a further year. 153 
Technically, binding and non-binding referenda have to be implemented by 
Parliament. This raises the question as to whether, theoretically, Parliament could 
refuse to implement a binding referendum if it so chose.154 But even not-binding 
referenda bind Parliament at least in practise. 
153 Compare: Helena Catt "Citizens' Initiated Referenda" in Raymond Miller (ed) New Zealand -
Government and Politics (University Press, Oxford, 2001 ) 386, 387. 
154 Keith Jackson "Parliament" in Raymond Miller (ed) New Zealand - Government and Politics 
(University Press, Oxford, 2001 ) 76, 78 . 
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(i) Other extra-legal limitation 
Even Dicey acknowledged extra-legal constraints on parliamentary power. He 
believed wholly unacceptable legislation would be legally valid but politically 
impossible. He quoted Stephen's "blue-eyed baby" hypothesis: 155 
If a legislature decided that all blue-eyed babies should 
be murdered, the preservation of blue-eyed babies would 
be illegal; but legislators must go mad before they could 
pass such a law, and subjects be idiotic before they 
could submit to it. 
The sanction for breach 1s adverse government publicity, thereby 
exemplifying a broader constraint. Governments usually show little concern for 
public opinion during their first years in office, using these as "worlang" terms for 
implementing policies, but they show concern during election year. 156 
A further extra-legal restraint is pragmatism. Parliament will not legislate for 
impractical causes, it will not legislate knowing that its statutes will be 
unenforceable. 157 
U) Assessment 
Most of the above mentioned aspects which raise doubts about the application 
of the doctrine in New Zealand are in dispute. But even if one subscribes to a 
doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty that is defined in a way that allows New 
Zealand's constitution to fit in, it has to be acknowledged that there are at least a lot 
of practical and extra-legal limits of the sovereignty of New Zealand's Parliament. 
155 Albert Venn Dicey Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (lOed, 1885; 
rerinted: Macmillan & Co, London, 1959) 81. 
15 Philip A Joseph Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand (2ed, Brookers, 
Wellington, 2001) 496. 
157 Joseph, above, 506. 
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2 United Kingdom 
According to the traditional view, the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty 
applies in the United Kingdom. As Lord Reid stated in Madzimbamuto v Lardner-
Burke: 158 
It is often said that it would be unconstitutional for the 
United Kingdom Parliament to do certain things, meaning 
that the moral, political and other reasons against doing 
them are so strong that most people would regard it as 
highly improper if Parliament did these things . But that 
does not mean that it is beyond the power of Parliament to 
do such things . If Parliament chose to do any of them the 
courts could not hold the Act of Parliament invalid. 
(a) European Union 
In the United Kingdom, the courts have had to cope with the inroad into the 
doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty brought about by the country's entry into the 
European Community. 159 
The United Kingdom generally has a dualist approach to international law, 
including the law of the European Community. This means that international 
obligations will become binding internally when incorporated or transformed into 
domestic law by an act of Parliament. 160 
However, a number of Articles of the European Union Treaty have been held 
to have direct effect in each member state. According to Article 189 of the 
European Union Treaty, regulations are always directly effective, directives may be 
in special circumstances. 
Furthermore, the European Court of Justice has repeatedly held that 
Community law must take precedence in the event of a clash with national law. 
158 Madzimbamuto v Lardner-Burke (1969) 1 AC 645 , 723 . 
159 Sir H William R Wade "Sovereignty-Revolution or Evolution?" (1996) 112 LQR 568 . 
160 Paul Denham Law - a modern introduction ( 4ed, Hudder & Stoughton, 1999) 89. 
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Where two English statutes conflict, the purely domestic approach is that the 
latest expression of Parliament's prevails. 
It was therefore not surprising that Community law would prevail over pre-
1972 legislation and that the courts were bound to interpret domestic legislation in 
accordance with Community law where possible. 
The United Kingdom courts have consistently attempted to prevent a conflict 
between United Kingdom law and Community law by reading the United Kingdom 
law to be compatible with Community law requirements. 161 As the Factortame 
cases demonstrate, this is not always possible. 162 
Lord Bridge of Harwich stated in the Factortame (No 2) case: 163 
If the supremacy within the European Community of 
Community law over the national law of member states 
was not always inherent in the European Economic 
Community Treaty it was certainly well established in the 
jurisprudence of the Court of Justice long before the 
United Kingdom joined the Community. Thus, whatever 
limitation of its sovereignty Parliament accepted when it 
enacted the European Communities Act 1972 it was 
entirely voluntary. Under the terms of the 1972 Act it has 
always been clear that it was the duty of a United 
Kingdom court, when delivering final judgment, to 
override any rule of national law found to be in conflict 
with any directly enforceable rule of Community law. 
Some argued that this decision was a blow to the doctrine of parliamentary 
sovereignty. It represents an exception to the rule that Parliament cannot bind its 
successors, as the Parliament of 1972 has bound its successors. 164 
161 Paul Craig "Constitutionalism, Regulation and Review" in Robert Hazell (ed) Constitutional 
Futures -A History of the next ten years (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999) 69. 
162 R v Secretary of State for Transport, ex p Factortame Ltd [ 1990] 2 AC 85; R v Secretary of State 
for Transport, exp F actortame Ltd ( No 2) [ 1991] 1 AC 603 . 
163 R v Secretary of State for Transport, exp Factortame Ltd (No 2) (1991 ] l AC 603 , 658. 
164 Sir H William R Wade "Sovereignty - Revolution or Evolution" (1996) 112 LQR 568; Lord 
Cooke of Thorndon "The Role of the Judges" in Colin James (ed) Building the Constitution (Institute 
of Policy Studies, Wellington, 2000) 371 , 374. 
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Others argued that, derived from section 2 (4) of the European Communities 
Act 1972, all this decision did was to implement a rule of construction. The United 
Kingdom Parliament is presumed not to intend statutes to override Community 
law .165 The Hon Sir John Laws described the decision as providing that: 166 
the rule of construction implanted by section 2 (4) cannot 
be abrogated by an implied repeal. Express words would 
be required. That, however, is hardly revolutionary: there 
are numbers of areas where a particular statutory 
construction is only likely to be accepted by the courts if 
it is vouchsafed by express provision. 
Nevertheless, the Factortame cases are the clearest indication that the 
European Union membership is no longer compatible with Dicey's classical 
doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty. 167 
The recent case of Thoburn v Sunderland City Council & Ors168 revisited the 
issue of parliamentary sovereignty in the context of the European Communities Act 
1972. Four retailers were prosecuted for trading in imperial weights after it became 
unlawful to use imperial measures under secondary legislation enacted to ensure the 
United Kingdom's compliance with European Community directives. The 
Divisional Court set out that Community law could not be entrenched in English 
law because Parliament could not bind its successors against repeal of the European 
Communities Act 1972. However, the court held that the European Communities 
Act was a constitutional statute and could not be impliedly repealed. This was the 
first open recognition of the constitutional status of the European Community Act 
1972. 
Although most writers agree that Parliamentary sovereignty has been 
compromised by the United Kingdom's membership of the European Community, 
it is generally accepted that this limitation is reversible through withdrawal from the 
165 P Craig "Sovereignty of the United Kingdom Parliament after Factortame" ( 1991) 11 YBEL 221. 
166 Hon Sir John Laws "Law and Democracy" [1995] PL 72, 89. 
167 John F McEldowney Public Law (Sweet & Maxwell , London, 1998) 34. 
168 Thoburn v Sunderland City Council & Ors [2002] LTL 18/02/2002. 
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European Community. 169 This may be the case, but today's constitutional fact is 
that there is a hierarchy in the law of the United Kingdom - European Community 
law prevails over United Kingdom law. In my opinion, it is probable that this 
hierarchy will be maintained and even strengthened, as it is unlikely that the United 
Kingdom withdraw from the European Union. 
(b) Human Rights Act 1998 
The United Kingdom incorporated the European Convention on Human 
Rights into United Kingdom law through the Human Rights Act 1998. 170 
The Human Rights Act 1998 neither entrenches European Convention rights, 
allowing them to take priority as a matter of law over later legislation, nor grants 
complete political freedom to Parliament to undermine them by later statutory 
amendment. Instead, ministers stressed during the relevant parliamentary 
proceedings that the Act is designed to be compatible with parliamentary 
sovereignty, while also giving effective protection to Convention rights.
171 
The balance between Convention rights and Parliamentary sovereignty is 
effected via sections 3, 4 and 10 of the Act. Section 3 requires courts to construe 
legislation "so far as it is possible to do so" in conformity with Convention rights. 
Where this proves impossible, the courts issue a declaration of incompatibility 
under section 4. Such a declaration will not, however, affect the validity, continuing 
operation or enforcement of the offending legislation. Section 10 makes provision 
for such legislation to me amended by ministerial order to remedy the 
incompatibility, but does not lay down a requirement that this must be done.
172 The 
expectation is that a judicial declaration of incompatibility will render it difficult for 
Parliament to resist modification of the offending provisions.
173 
169 Mark Elliott "The Demise of Parliamentary Sovereignty ? The Implications for Justifying Judicial 
Review" (1999) 115 LQR 119,128. 
170 Paul Rishworth "The Rights Debate: Can We, Should We, Adopt a Written Constitution 
Including a Bill of Rights ?" in Colin James (ed) Building the Constitution (Institute of Policy 
Studies, Wellington, 2000) 397,403 . 
171 Nicholas Bamforth "Parliamentary sovereignty and the Human Rights Act 1998" PL 572. 
172 Nicholas Bamforth "Parliamentary sovereignty and the Human Rights Act 1998" PL 573. 
173 Paul Craig "Constitutionalism, Regulation and Review" in Robert Hazell (ed) Constitutional 
Futures -A History of The Next Ten Years (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999) 67, 70. 
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The dual prospects of judicial declarations of incompatibility and 
administrative amendments to parliamentary enactments will lead the legislature to 
exercise self-regulation in order to ensure that, save in exceptional circumstances, 
legislation is consistent with the rights protected by the Convention. In this sense, 
the Human Rights Act will fetter Parliament's legislative freedom.174 
Furthermore, section 19 of the Act requires the minister in charge of a Bill in 
either House to make a statement in writing, before the Bill's second reading, that in 
the minister's opinion the provisions of the Bill are compatible with Convention 
rights, or that the government wishes to proceed with the Bill even though such a 
statement cannot be made. 
Therefore, in my opinion, regarding the Human Rights Act, Parliament's 
legislative freedom is limited in practise by the two other branches of government, 
the executive and the judiciary. 
( c) Interpretation 
In Anisminic v Foreign Compensation Commission175, section 4 (4) of the 
Foreign Compensation Act 1950, which provided that decisions of the Foreign 
Compensation Commission "shall not be called into question in any court of law", 
was interpreted in a way that judicial review was possible. One view is that the 
judiciary asserted, or at least came close to asserting, that the courts would not 
enforce a statutory provision which effectively required them to surrender their 
capacity to review the decisions of an all-powerful executive.
176 Since that case, 
Parliament has not again mounted such a challenge to the reviewing power of the 
High Court. 177 Others explain the decision as the result of a rule of construction, 
whereby clauses excluding the courts ' jurisdiction should be narrowly 
interpreted. 178 
174 Mark Elliott "The Demise of Parliamentary Sovereignty ? The Implications for Justifying Judicial 
Review" (1999) 115LQR 119, 127. 
175 Anisminic Ltd v Foreign Compensation Commission [1962) 2 AC 147 . 
176 E W Thomas "The Relationship of Parliament and the Courts: A Tentative Thought or Two for 
the New Millennium" (2000) 31 VUWLR 27. 
177 Rt Hon Lord Woolf of Barnes "Droit Public - English Style" [1995) PL 57, 69. 
178 T R S Allan "Parliamentary Sovereignty: Law, Politics, and Revolution" [1997) 113 LQR 447 . 
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More recently, in R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte 
Simms179, Lord Hoffmann stated: 180 
Parliamentary sovereignty means that Parliament can, if it 
chooses, legislate contrary to fundamental principles of 
human rights. The Human Rights Act 1998 will not 
detract from this power. The constraints upon its exercise 
by Parliament are ultimately political, not legal. But the 
principle of legality means that Parliament must squarely 
confront what it is doing and accept the political cost. 
Fundamental rights cannot be overridden by general or 
ambiguous words. This is because there is too great a risk 
that the full implications of their unqualified meaning 
may have passed unnoticed in the democratic process. In 
the absent of express language or necessary implication to 
the contrary, the courts therefore presume that even the 
most general words were intended to be subject to the 
basic rights of the individual. In this way the courts of the 
United Kingdom, though acknowledging the sovereignty 
of Parliament, apply principles of constitutionality little 
different form those which exist in countries where the 
power of the legislature is expressly limited by a 
constitutional document. 
Therefore, the interpretation of statutes by the courts is, even if the doctrine is 
upheld, a practical limitation of Parliament's omnipotence. 
(d) Other extra-legal limitation 
Fundamental common Jaw rights, entrenched legislation, international law 
and the public limit the sovereignty of the United J(jngdom Parliament as they limit 
New Zealand's parliamentary sovereignty. 
179 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Simms [2000] 2 AC 115 - 146 (HL). 
180 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Simms, above, 131 Lord Hoffmann. 
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(e) A.ssessment 
Similar to the assessment in New Zealand, the application of the doctrine in 
the United Kingdom depends on the definition of parliamentary sovereignty. Even 
if one is of the opinion that the membership of the United Kingdom in the European 
Union is not the end of the doctrine, one must at least acknowledge that the 
sovereignty of the Parliament is fettered by this membership, the interpretation of 
acts by the courts and some extra-legal limitations. 
3 Germany 
In Germany the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty is unknown. But this 
does not necessarily mean that the principles of the doctrine would not apply. 
(a) Hierarchy of Jaw 
A.s Germany is a federal state and part of the European Union, there is a 
hierarchy of the different sources of the Jaw. 
The Jaw of the European Community prevails over the Germab Jaw, even over 
the "supreme" constitutional law. 181 
A.ccording to A.rticle 31 of the "Grundgesetz" (Basic Law), the federal Jaw 
prevails over the Jaw of the "Lander". But this A.rticle is logically not applicable, as 
the "Grundgesetz" contains competence provisions, distributing every issue either 
to the federal Parliament or to the parliaments of the "Lander". If there is a clash of 
provisions, one provision must logically be void as it contravenes the competence 
provisions and therefore the "Grundgesetz". 182 
181 Compare: Solange J - Beschluss (Until I - decision) (1974) 37 BVerfGE 271, 277 
(Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal Constitutional Court)); Solange II - Beschluss (Until II -
decision) [1986) 73 BVerfGE 339,387 (Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal Constitutional Court)). 
182 Jorn lpsen Staatsrecht I - Staatsorganisationsrecht (12ed, Luchterland, Neuwied and Kriftel, 
2000) 625. 
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Within the federal law and the law of each "Land", there is also a hierarchy of 
the law. The top of the hierarchy is created by the constitutions, which include 
human rights. The second ranked ordinary statutes made by the Parliament are 
superior to delegated legislation. 
If there is a contradiction between higher ranked law and lower ranked law 
the latter is void: lex superior derogat legi inferiori. 
(b) Entrenched constitution 
According to Article 79 (2) of the "Grundgesetz", all prov1s10ns of the 
"Grundgesetz" can only be changed by an act of Parliament adopted with a two-
thirds majority. According to Article 79 (3) of the "Grundgesetz", the protection of 
human dignity, Article 1, and the basic principles of democracy, federalism and 
social state, Article 20, are legally unalterable. 183 However, Article 79 (3) of the 
"Grundgesetz" itself is not among the unalterable provisions. It is in dispute, if 
Article 79 (3) can be repealed itself. 184 In my opinion, Article 79 (3) and therefore 
the whole "Grundgesetz" can be repealed theoretically. In practise, it is unthinkable 
that the German federal Parliament would desire to change this provision - and if it 
did, it would be a revolution. 
(c) Human Rights 
Article 1 (3) of the "Grundgesetz" provides that all three branches of 
government are bound to the constitution. This includes, that acts of Parliament will 
be declared void by, and only by, the "Bundesverfassungsgericht" (Federal 
Constitutional Court), if they contravene the "Grundgesetz" and, particularly, its 
human rights. 
183 Bruno Schmidt-Bleibtreu and Franz Klein Kommentar ::.um Grundgesetz far die Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland (6th ed, Neuwied, 1983) Art 79, 10; Jorn Ipsen Staatsrecht I - Staatsorganisationsrecht 
(12ed, Luchterland, Neuwied and Kriftel. 2000) 889. 
184 Ipsen, above, 256. 
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(d) Assessment 
All features of the German constitution can be interpreted m a way 
compatible with the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. 
As the legislation of the German Parliament prevails over all other national 
legislations, the German Parliament is the supreme law-making body. Regarding the 
membership of Germany in the European Union, there is no difference to the 
membership of the United Kingdom - both states are theoretically able to withdraw 
from the Union. 
Furthermore, it can be said that the German Parliament can legislate on every 
topic it desires. Although there are issues which are distributed to the Parliaments of 
the "Lander", the federal Parliament can legislate on these issues as it has the power 
to change the provisions containing these distributions. The requirement of a two-
thirds majority for changing the German constitution can be interpreted as a rule of 
construction, as the entrenchment of provisions is interpreted in this way. The only 
limit, imposed by the arguably changeable Article 79 (3) of the "Grundgesetz" is 
the federalism, so that there always must remain some competence for the 
Parliaments of the "Lander". 
The power of the "Bundesverfassungsgericht" to strike down legislation 
which is inconsistent with the "Grundgesetz" can also be interpreted as a rule of 
construction, as the federal Parliament has the theoretical power to change the 
jurisdiction of the "Bundesverfassungsgericht" . 
The principle that Parliament cannot bind its successors applies in Germany 
as well. For example, the announced attempt of the government, consisting of the 
Social Democrat Party and the Greens , to unchangeably withdraw form nuclear 
power plants in the next years , cannot be legally successful, as the next Parliament 
can change any piece of legislation, if it wishes to do so. 
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The principle of implied repeal also applies in Germany. Regarding law of the 
same level of the hierarchy, there is the rule of interpretation that later statutes 
prevail over former statutes. 
The classic doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty does not apply in Germany. 
With the help of the rule of construction, however, the doctrine can be defined in a 
way that the doctrine applies. Furthermore, if Germany had a history of 
parliamentary sovereignty, in my opinion, today's scholars would argue if the 
doctrine still applies in Germany, or not, and to which extent - in the same way as 
the discussion takes place in New Zealand and the United Kingdom. 
4 Comparison 
In my opinion, the question whether parliamentary sovereignty exists in New 
Zealand and the United Kingdom or even Germany is a question of the definition of 
the term parliamentary sovereignty. 
If the pure definition of Dicey is used, neither New Zealand, England nor 
Germany apply the concept of parliamentary sovereignty. 
But if a re-defined term of parliamentary sovereignty is used, the doctrine of 
parliamentary sovereignty applies in New Zealand, the United Kingdom and, in my 
opinion, even in Germany. The legally entrenched and especially the few arguably 
unchangeable provisions in the German "Grundgesetz" are the same provisions 
which are - with the exception of federalism - arguably the limits of the common 
law, or at least the limits created by the pressure of the public: human rights and 
basic democratic principles. Therefore, from a practical point of view, the limits or 
restraints of an all-powerful Parliament are the same. Thus, in this regard there is no 
substantial difference between the United Kingdom and New Zealand on one hand 
and Germany on the other. 
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5 Assessment 
The definition of a term only makes sense, if it is so clear and precise that the 
term can be distinguished from other terms - otherwise the definition is useless. If a 
term cannot be defined in that way, the term itself is useless . 
If one is of the view that the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty still applies 
in New Zealand and in the United Kingdom, one has to admit that the doctrine must 
be re-defined in order to maintain the doctrine as a description of the constitutional 
reality. If the doctrine is re-defined in such a way, even the constitution of Germany 
is compatible with this doctrine. 
Traditionally the characteristics of not having a written constitution, not 
having a Supreme Court and not having a superior Bill of Rights are attributed to 
the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. These attributes , however, are the key 
factors which distinguish the constitutions of New Zealand and the United Kingdom 
on the one hand and the German constitution on the other. 
Thus, the classical definition of the doctrine does not describe today' s 
constitutional reality; the modified definition makes the doctrine undistinguishable. 
The doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty is therefore useless . 
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IV ASSESSMENT OF THE DOCTRINE OF PARLIAMENTARY 
SOVEREIGNTY 
Debates are often confusing due to the wide variety of meanings attributable 
to the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty.185 In the following, the doctrine will be 
defined as the status quo of New Zealand, particularly not having a written 
constitution, not having a superior Bill of Rights and not having a Supreme Court, 
which can strike down acts of Parliament. 
Whereas the introduction of binding referenda, entrenched electoral law, or 
membership in a supernational organizations such as the European Union, might be 
seen as a question of taste, "the entrenchment of human rights is required as a badge 
of ci viii sati on" 186. 
Two questions should not be confused: The question if New Zealand can, and 
the question if New Zealand should introduce a supreme Bill of Rights. 
A Can a Superior Bill of Rights Be Introduced ? 
The question is raised whether it is possible to impose constitutional limits, 
such as a superior Bill of Rights would involve, upon New Zealand ' s Parliament 
with its traditional doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. Or more abstract: Can a 
body with unlimited powers use that power to impose limits upon itself for the 
future? 
Some authors are of the view that this is possible.
187 
The general proposition 
is that New Zealanders should have the kind of constitution that a majority of New 
Zealanders want, and if that means that constitutional limits are to be imposed, then 
185 E C S Wade and AW Bradley Constitutional and Administrative Law ( l led, Longman, London 
and New York, 1993) 69. 
186 Lord Cooke of Thorndon "The Role of the Judges" in Colin James (ed) Building the Constitution 
(Institute of Policy Studies, Wellington, 2000) 371. 
187 Paul Rishworth "The Rights Debate: Can We, Should We, Adopt a Written Constitution 
Including a Bill of Rights ?" in Colin James (ed) Building the Constitution (Institute of Policy 
Studies, Wellington, 2000) 397 , 399 . 
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so be it.
188 A successful adoption of a supreme Bill of Rights depends ultimately on 
the judiciary accepting that this Bill of Rights is supreme - that turns on the 
measure being demonstrated to have widespread public support.
189 Majority 
approval by the electorate in a referendum would signify such support, as perhaps 
would a near unanimous vote in the Parliament. 
In my opinion, the question itself should not be asked for two reasons. 
First, parliamentary sovereignty cannot be used as a slogan, as if its meaning 
were self-evident. 190 This is - as shown above - not the case: Therefore the question 
of definition is prior to this question. The point is that what is meant by the phrase 
parliamentary sovereignty has changed over time, and, especially today, depends 
somewhat on the speaker. 191 
Acknowledging that, it is suggested that the true debate about parliamentary 
sovereignty should be about the proper conception of the doctrine in contemporary 
New Zealand. 192 But this is, secondly, one step too short and the question is 
converse. In my opinion, the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty is only a vague 
description of the constitution, but not the constitutional law itself. If the 
constitution is changed, then - depending on the definition of the doctrine - the 
doctrine applies, or does not apply. The doctrine itself, however, should not be seen 
as an obstacle for changing the constitution. 
Therefore, in my opinion, the only question in this regard should be: Should 
New Zealand have a superior Bill of Rights ? 
188 Paul Rishworth "The Rights Debate: Can We, Should We, Adopt a Written Constitution 
Including a Bill of Rights ?" in Colin James (ed) Building the Constitution (Institute of Policy 
Studies, Wellington, 2000) 397, 400. 
189 Rishworth, above, 400. 
190 Daniel Kalderimis "R v Pora" (2001) NZLJ 369. 
191 Kalderimis, above, 370. 
192 Kalderimis, above, 369. 
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B Should a Superior Bill of Rights Be Introduced ? 
It is argued that a governmental system including the doctrine of 
parliamentary sovereignty and without a superior Bill of Rights tends to be more 
flexible and informal. 193 But the "limits on the supremacy of Parliament which it is 
the courts' inalienable responsibility to identify and uphold ... are limits of the most 
modest dimensions which I believe any democrat would accept" 194. Furthermore, 
provided that Parliament does not legislate contrary to the Bill of Rights, the 
position regarding statute law is precisely the same as it is under the orthodox 
doctrine of sovereignty: No court is permitted to contravene the will of 
Parliament. 195 
Some argue that key social policy decisions are made in a much more 
democratic fashion without a Supreme Court, as political choices and social policy-
making decisions get transmogrified into legal issues, 196 and in a democracy the 
only law-makers should be elected ones; Judges should make law only in the 
"interstices", the small gaps left by legislation. 197 This view neglects that the judges 
of a Supreme Court do not make law, they are just able to strike down a statute or 
more likely only some provisions of it which actually contravene the Human 
Rights, so that Parliament can repeal or amend the legislation. Insofar, the 
declaration of incompatibility according to the Human Rights Act 1998 in the 
United Kingdom and the Moonen decision in New Zealand has the same effect. The 
only difference is that the pressure to pass new law, which does not infringe the Bill 
of Rights, is legal and not only practical. The German "Bundesverfassungsgericht" 
has made law only if the situation without any provisions would be worse and only 
until Parliament has passed new legislation. Furthermore, a Supreme Court does not 
193 Compare: Philip Joseph "The Legal History and Framework of the Constitution" in Colin James 
(ed) Building the Constitution (Institute of Policy Studies, Wellington, 2000) 168, 169. 
194 Rt Hon Lord Woolf of Barnes "Droit Public: English Style" (1995] PL 57 , 69. 
195 Mark Elliott "The Demise of Parliamentary Sovereignty ? The Implications for Justifying Judicial 
Review" (1999) 115 LQR 119,131. 
196 James Allen "No to a Written Constitution" in Colin James (ed) Building the Constitution 
(Institute of Policy Studies, Wellington, 2000) 391,392. 
197 Paul Rishworth "The Rights Debate: Can We, Should We, Adopt a Written Constitution 
Including a Bill of Rights ?" in Colin James (ed) Building the Constitution (Institute of Policy 
Studies, Wellington, 2000) 397,411. 
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mean that there is judiciary supremacy, as it is the constitution of the people which 
is supreme and not the Court. 198 
It is stated that many proponents of a written constitution simply believe that 
unelected judges are more to be trusted than elected politicians, but some see no 
persuasive evidence for this essentially undemocratic belief. 199 On the other hand, 
despite being criticised for some judgments, which is in my view unavoidable for a 
institution in such as high position, the "Bundesverfassungsgericht" is probably the 
most popular institution in Germany. 
It is argued that opting for a superior Bill of Rights within a written 
constitution involves a fair degree of paternalism, not to say arrogance, as written 
constitutions are, by their nature, hard to amend and the whole point of a written 
constitution, therefore, is to lock in particular provisions and to make changes very 
difficult. 200 This was justifiable only if those doing the locking-in know what is best 
for later generations.201 In my opinion, guaranteeing fundamental human rights, is 
unlikely to become out-of-date. But, even if the case occurred, there would still be 
the possibility of a legitimate revolution. 
If there is a Supreme Court, which could strike down acts of Parliament, the 
composition of this court would be a matter of considerable importance. It is argued 
that the executive would therefore attempt to ensure that judges are appointed who 
are likely to give decisions, which are m line with the executive ' s thinking. 
Although it is a fact, that most judges of the "Bundesverfassungsgericht" are 
members of political parties, there is no complaint about the impartiality of its 
judges, as the election of the judges of the "Bundesverfassungsgericht" requires a 
two-thirds majority by both Houses of Parliament according to Article 94 (1) ((2)) 
of the "Grundgesetz". The figure of the so-called guardians of the minority's rights 
requires that the minority has to participate in its guardians' elections.
202 
198 Klaus Schlaich Das Bundesverfassungsgericht (4ed, CH Beck, Mtinchen, 1997) 26. 
199 James Allen "No to a Written Constitution" in Colin James (ed) Building the Constitution 
(Institute of Policy Studies, Wellington, 2000) 391 , 392. 
200 Allen , above, 392. 
201 Allen , above , 392. 
202 Schlaich, above, 33. 
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Furthermore, until today no decision was split according to the membership of 
the judges to the political parties. 
It is also argued, that there is no basis for supposing that judges, trained in 
law, are better equipped to decide human rights issues than legislators, as they bring 
to some extent their subjective judgement to the issue. 203 Although it has to be 
admitted that human rights law is difficult law and many decisions in courts around 
the world are close and very few are unanimous, it must be acknowledged that the 
policy issues inherent in rights questions are generally made the subject of much 
better argument in constitutional litigation than they are in politics, for often there 
will have been several years for a constitutional case to develop through the lower 
courts, by which time the issues will be thoroughly researched and refined by the 
protagonists, and courts can take as Jong as they like to decide.204 On the other 
hand, good decisions may be fast decisions. It can be observed in Germany that it 
sometimes takes years until a final decision is made. 
In my opinion, the decisive argument in favour of a superior Bill of Rights 
protected by judges of a Supreme Court is, that the courts are better protectors of 
minorities, as the minority needs protection and not the majority that is represented 
in Parliament. The tyranny of the majority was even recognised by Tocqueville and 
Bacon: 205 
If force prevail above lawful regiment, how easy it will be 
to procure an act of Parliament to pass according to the 
humour and bent of the State, to sweep away all these 
perpetuities which are already slandered and discredited. 
There are certain basic rights which should not be capable of being easily 
overridden by a majority, as minority rights should not depend on the pleasure of 
203 Paul Rishworth "The Rights Debate: Can We, Should We, Adopt a Written Constitution 
Including a Bill of Rights ?" in Colin James (ed) Building the Constitution (Institute of Policy 
Studies, Wellington, 2000) 397, 410; James Allen "No to a Written Constitution" in Colin James 
(ed) Building the Constitution (Institute of Policy Studies, Wellington, 2000) 391,392. 
204 Rishworth , above, 411 . 
205 Sian Elias "The Treaty of Waitangi and the Separation of Powers in New Zealand" in B D Gray 
and RB McClintock (eds) Courts Policy: Checking the Balance (Brookers, Wellington, 1995) 206, 
227. 
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the majority.206 A Parliament that respects the rights of the minorities is the ideal, 
but only non-elected judges are an essential insurance against the dictation of the 
majority. 207 
The mere power of the courts to make a declaration of incompatibility, does 
not help the individual that suffers from the infringement of the Bill of Rights either 
directly by the legislation, or indirectly by an act of the executive based on the 
legislation. It is unlikely that a Parliament that is aware of the infringement changes 
its legislation due to such a declaration. Some writers consider it as an acceptable 
result, if the Parliament states "Well, that is the Court's view, but ours is 
different".208 Although the electorate can decide whether it still wished those 
parliamentarians to retain office, the right of the individual who suffered from the 
legislation is still infringed and perhaps the infringement is tolerated or even 
approved by the majority. Furthermore, even if Parliament changed its legislation, it 
would be too late for the individual. 
206 Lord Cooke of Thorndon "The Role of the Judges" in Colin James (ed) Building the Constitution 
(Institute of Policy Studies, Wellington, 2000) 371, 375; compare: Rt Hon Sir Robin Cooke 
"Fundamentals" [1988] NZLJ 158, 159. 
207 Lord Cooke of Thorndon, above, 3 7 5. 
208 Paul Rishworth "The Rights Debate: Can We, Should We, Adopt a Written Constitution 
Including a Bill of Rights ?" in Colin James (ed) Building the Constitution (Institute of Policy 
Studies, Wellington, 2000) 397, 407 . 
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V THE BETTER CONCEPT: THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE PEOPLE 
A Is Another Concept Possible ? 
Dicey' s doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty IS a coherent theory of a 
constitutional system. It is, however, only a theory and it is, thus, possible to take 
another view of the constitutional system.209 In the words of Lord Cooke of 
Thomdon: 210 
Before any serious discussion of the subject it is 
necessary to get Dicey out of the way. Of immense 
historical weight, a weight still continuing among 
those who prefer not to be troubled by much thinking 
about the subject, his hypnotically persuasive 
pronouncements do not condescend to deal with 
obvious difficulties. At any rate those usually quoted 
do not. 
As the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty is, in my opinion, paradoxical, 
historically doubtful and useless, a better concept is not only possible, but also 
required. 
B The Concept of Popular Sovereignty 
Parliament's power to legislate cannot confer this power on itself. Thus, 
Parliament, as the executive and the judiciary, must look to the people for the 
f · 211 source o Its power. 
In a full and free democracy, sovereignty rests with the people.
212 Therefore, 
the fundamental plank of today's constitution is the sovereignty of the people, and 
neither the sovereignty of Parliament nor the supremacy of the courts.
213 
209 Philip Allott "The Courts and Parliament: Who Whom?" [1979] CLJ 79, 80. 
210 Rt Hon Sir Robin Cooke "Fundamentals" (1988] NZLJ 158, 160. 
211 E W Thomas "The Relationship of Parliament and the Courts: A Tentative Thought or Two for 
the New Millennium" (2000) 31 VUWLR 21. 
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Unable to undertake the machinery of government, the people have delegated 
that task together with such powers as are necessary to carry it out to the three 
branches of government: legislative, executive and judiciary. Parliament's 
legislative supremacy would continue to be the rule, with Parliament enacting laws 
and the courts interpreting those laws. Tension would only arise, should the 
commitment of one or the other suffer an unconstitutional lapse.214 
The power to infringe fundamental human rights is not conferred to the 
government, as such power is not necessary to undertake the machinery of 
government. Which human rights are part of these fundamental rights depends on 
the perception of the consensus of the people as to what is or is not tolerable. 215 
Furthermore, nothing in this concept suggests that the people have delegated 
to government the power to destroy this machinery. 216 Parliament's legislative 
supremacy as well as the court's and the executive's power is limited by its 
essential constitutional function. If Parliament should cease to be a representative 
assembly in any plausible sense, or if it proceeded to enact legislation undermining 
the democratic basis on which it exercises the sovereign power of the people, there 
is nothing which would preclude judicial resistance rather than obedience.
217 
On the other hand, the exercise of the power to strike down parliamentary 
legislation, when it is not strictly necessary to preserve the basis of representative 
government or the fundamental human rights, is a usurpation of power which is as 
unconstitutional as would be Parliament's attempt to destroy democracy or override 
those rights by legislation. 218 
212 Compare: Philip Allott "The Courts and Parliament: Who Whom?" [1979) CLJ 79, 80. 
213 E W Thomas "The Relationship of Parliament and the Courts: A Tentative Thought or Two for 
the New Millennium" (2000) 31 VUWLR 21 and 36. 
214 Thomas, above, 30. 
215 Thomas, above, 25. 
216 Thomas, above, 22. 
217 T R S Allan 'The Limits of Parliamentary Sovereignty" [1985) PL 621 according to E W Thomas 
"The Relationship of Parliament and the Courts: A Tentative Thought or Two for the New 
Millennium" (2000) VUWLR 22. 
218 Thomas, above, 29. 
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Even Lord Cooke of Thorndon's concept of fundamental common law rights 
fits into this concept, as the courts can intervene if an act of Parliament breaches the 
delegated power. 
Rt Hon Lord Woolf of Barnes takes a similar approach. He bases the 
parliamentary democracy on the rule of law, which consists of the supremacy of 
Parliament in its legislative capacity and the courts as final arbiters as to the 
interpretation and application of the law. 21 9 
Similarly, in Hon Sir John Laws view, the ultimate sovereignty rests not with 
those who wield governmental power, but in the conditions under which they are 
permitted to do so. The constitution, he states, not the Parliament, is in this sense 
sovereign.220 He asserts that: 221 
It is a condition of democracy' s preservation that the 
power of a democratically elected government - or 
Parliament - be not absolute. The institution of free and 
regular elections, like fundamental individual rights, has 
to be vindicated by a higher-order law: very obviously, 
no government, therefore, must be allowed to do so. 
Even Dicey, notwithstanding his insistence on parliamentary sovereignty, 
provides support for this view, as he states that "the essence of representative 
government is that the legislature should represent or give effect to the will of the 
political sovereign, ie of the electoral body, or the nation" .
222 
The German constitution is based on this concept, as well , as it states in 
Article 20 (2) ((1)) of the "Grundgesetz" that all state authority emanates from the 
people, and Article 1 (3) provides that the basic rights shall bind the legislature, the 
executive and the judiciary as directly enforceable law. 
219 Rt Hon Lord Woolf of Barnes "Droit Public - English Style" [ 1995] PL 57 , 68. 
220 Hon Sir John Laws "Law and Democracy" [1995] PL 72, 92. 
22 1 Hon Sir John Laws, above, 85. 
222 E W Thomas "The Relationship of Parliament and the Courts: A Tentati ve Thought or Two for 
the New Millennium" (2000) VUWLR 21. 
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The application of this concept renders the doctrine of parliamentary 
sovereignty unnecessary, as it is the people who are sovereign.223 
Although it has to be acknowledged that this concept of popular sovereignty 
cannot be prooven better or worse than any other concept, it is a model that mirrors 
the reality of today's constitution and enables an open-ended discussion about 
constitutional issues. 
223 E w Thomas "The Relationship of Parliament and the Courts: A Tentative Thought or Two for 
the New Millennium" (2000) VUWLR 21. 
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VI CONCLUSION 
The doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty is paradoxically, as Parliament is 
all-powerful, yet powerless to limit its powers. Furthermore, contrary to its 
principles, some legislation is irreversible and the doctrine therefore not correct. 
The remaining elements of the doctrine are based on the common definition of the 
term Parliament and the constitutional decision, whether there is supreme law and 
whether courts have the power to strike down legislation which is inconsistent with 
this supreme law. 
Historically, the doctrine is a concept that reflects the struggle between the 
Crown and the Parliament. The reason for its recognition as law of the United 
Kingdom and New Zealand, however, is the mere assertion in a law book that the 
doctrine was law. 
Some features and developments in the constitutions of New Zealand and the 
United Kingdom require the doctrine to be re-defined in order to be applicable. Due 
to United Kingdom's membership in the European Union, the Treaty of Waitangi in 
New Zealand, some developments in the interpretation of statutes by the courts and 
extra-legal, practical restraints, it is at least doubtful whether such a re-definition is 
possible. Even if such a re-definition of the doctrine was possible, the doctrine 
would be without meaning as it could be applied even m Germany with its 
entrenched written constitution, its supreme human rights and its 
"Bundesverfassungsgericht" that can strike down Parliament's legislature. The term 
parliamentary sovereignty is therefore useless. 
In short, the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty is paradoxical, not correct, 
historically doubtful and useless. 
As debates are often confused because of the wide variety of meanings 
attributable to the sovereignty of Parliament, everything and the opposite can be 
explained. The doctrine, therefore, has the function of a smokescreen. 
59 
The usual structure of contemporary public law books is to describe the 
doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty in the first place and to explain in the next 
chapters where and why the doctrine does not apply. But instead of upholding a 
dubious doctrine, it is time to throw the term parliamentary sovereignty on the 
"historical rubbish heap" , stick to the constitutional facts and discuss the advantages 
and disadvantages of today' s constitutional issues on the fundament of a better 
concept, the concept of the sovereignty of the people: A superior Bill of Rights for 
New Zealand ? A written constitution that incorporates the Treaty of Waitangi ? 
Transformation into a republic ? Abolition of the Privy Council as New Zealand' s 
highest court ? Introduction of binding referenda ? 
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